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NEW MEXICO'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
PRESENTMENT WARRANTIES AND THE MYTH
OF THE "SHELTER PROVISION"
If the business world is to be served, commercial paper must be
negotiable-sufficiently negotiable to satisfy the needs of commerce.
To encourage negotiability, not only must the holder in due course'
be able to take paper free of claims and personal defenses, 2 he must
be able to dispose of the paper similarly free of such defenses. If
such a holder is unable to sell the paper he holds free of third
party claims, he will be reluctant to become a holder initially. Section 3-201 of the Uniform Commerical Code 3 attempts to protect
the holder's power to dispose of the paper. Subsection (1) of this
section-termed the "shelter provision" or "umbrella clause"reads as follows:
Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as
the transferor has therein, except that a transferee who has himself
been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or
who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim against it
cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due
course.

The extent of the protection accorded by the shelter provision,
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-3-302 (1953).
New Mexico's version of the Uniform Commerical Code, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 5OA-1101 to -9-507 (1953), is based on the 1958 Official Text, promulgated jointly by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
All references to New Mexico's version of the Code, often designated UCC both
in footnotes and text, will omit the full statutory citation. Citations to "Comments" are
those accompanying the 1958 Official Text.
References to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 83,
§§ 1-197, repealed by N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 96, § 10-102, will be to "NIL."
2. Hawkland, Commercial Paper 78 (1959):
Personal defenses are those which do not deny the existence of a contract
between prior parties, but which assert that the contract, by reason of some act
or circumstances occurring contemporaneously or subsequently, has become
voidable or defeasible, in whole or in part, between the original partiesas, for example, failure or absence of consideration, breach of warranty,
fraud in the inducement, duress, mistake, and the like. These defenses may
be asserted only against non-holders-in-due-course. [Emphasis added.]
3. UCC § 3-201.
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as it relates to presentment warranties4 under the Code, is analyzed
herein. Although examined in some depth, presentment warranties
are considered primarily in the context of the shelter provision.
And an inquiry is made into the finality-of-payment doctrineS-the
so-called codification of Price v. Neal"-as it relates to the shelter
and presentment warranties provisions.
The three basic areas of inquiry-shelter provision, presentment warranties, and finality of payment-are inter-related: the
status of the transferee under the shelter provision will determine
what warranties he can make; the tranferee's status and capacity
to make the presentment warranties will determine whether or not
such payment or acceptance is final. An understanding of all three
concepts is necessary in order to comprehend the conclusion reached
-that as applied to the warranties of presentment, the shelter provision's protection is, in part, a myth.
I
SHELTER PROVISION

Subject to two exceptions, the shelter provision (3-201 (1) ) vests
all rights of the transferor in his transferee. Both exceptions are
aimed at preventing the transferee from profiting by his own fraud.
The exceptions prevent a transferee from a holder in due course
from improving his position if he either has participated in any
fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, or, as a prior holder,
had notice which would prevent him from being a holder in due
course in his own right.
By operation of the shelter provision, the transferee acquires
whatever rights his transferor had-title if the transferor had
title, less than that if he did not. 7 A donee acquires all of the rights
of a donor despite the failure to give value. 8 Under the shelter
provision all rights of the tranferor are vested in the transferee by
the transfer of the instrument. Thus when the transferor is a holder
in due course, the transferee takes in that status, i.e., he has vested
in him rights that would have vested in him had he taken as an
4. UCC§3-417(1).
5. UCC § 3-418.
6. 3 Burr. 1353, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
panying text.
7. UCC § 3-201, Comment 1.
8. UCC § 3-201, Comment 2.

See notes 37-43 infra and accom-
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original holder in due course.9 Although he obtains all rights as a
holder in due course, the transferee need not satisfy the Code-established conditions precedent for such status." He can take without
value, in bad faith, with notice of a claim or defense against the
instrument, and after maturity yet still achieve status as a holder in
due course.
If the shelter provision were held to transfer every and any interest in the instrument as held by the transferor, including the
transferor's good faith (or lack of it) and other incidents of his
holding, the transferee would always be in the same position as
his transferor. In short, the transferee would be substituted for the
transferor. The shelter provision, however, is not that completenor should it be. What the shelter provision does is vest the transferor's rights in the transferee. Since both good and bad faith are
conditions of the mind or a state of knowledge, they can hardly be
rights. Hence, they are not transferred.
The essence of the shelter provision is deceptively simple. Its
application is basically mechanical. However, knowledge of its
operation is necessary to understand the position and, perhaps,
the plight of the transferee who in the future will make the presentment warranties.
The following three hypothetical problems illustrate the shelter
provision's operation:
1. A is a holder in due course acting in good faith. B, not acting
in good faith, acquires the instrument from A. Under the shelter
provision, B takes the rights of his transferor, a holder in due course
acting in good faith. But since B is not acting in good faith, and
since good faith is not transferable, B has the status of a holder in
due course not acting in good faith.
The result would be the same if B took with all the attributes of
a holder in due course, excepting the requirement of good faith,
or if he took in good faith but acquired guilty knowledge while
holding.
2.
9.
10.
(a)
(b)
(c)

C is an "original"" holder in due course. While holding, he

UCC § 3-201, Comment 1.
UCC § 3-302; (1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
for value; and
in good faith; and
without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense
against or claim to it on the part of any person.
11. "Original" holder in due course is used to distinguish a transferee under the
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learns of a defense to the instrument. Thereafter, C, without disclosing the existence of the defense, transfers the instrument to D
who takes in good faith. D would take with all the rights of C as
a holder in due course. However, he would not be burdened with
C's guilty knowledge.
3. E, a holder in due course acting in bad faith, transfers to F
who takes without value, not in good faith, and with notice of a defense to the paper. F transfers to G who takes without value and
after maturity. G is vested with E's rights which were vested in F
by E. If in addition G acts in good faith, he is a holder in due course
acting in good faith. Here G merely adds the good faith element
to the rights transferred to him by E, a holder in due course.
Each of these three problems demonstrates the non-transferability
of the transferor's faith-whether it be good or bad. Good or bad
faith is not a right, hence it is not transferred, and must therefore
arise, if at all, in the transferee. Since only rights are transferred,
it follows that the rights transferred by a holder in due course are
the same whether or not he was acting in good faith. Good faith is
tested subjectively.' 2 Thus, it is conceivable that the transferee acting in bad faith at the time of taking could be acting in good faith
at the time of presenting.' 3
II
PRESENTMENT WARRANTIES

Before considering the specific presentment warranties, attention must be given to the general concept of warranties in the commercial paper area. Section 3-417 (1), which contains the presentment warranties, starts as follows: "Any person who obtains payshelter provision who because of the provision's application becomes a holder in due
course, and a transferee who takes as a holder in due course in his own right-an
original holder in due course. Of course, the rights of both are the same.
12. UCC §1-201(19): "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." (Emphasis added.)
Obviously, good or bad faith is a personal thing. As such, it must be tested by a
subjective standard, i.e., whether or not the actor used good faith, not whether a
reasonable man would have been acting in good faith.
See, Fagan, The Concept of Good Faith in Negotiable Instrument Law, 32 Ind.
L.J. 8 (1957) ; Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance And Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963).
13. Apparently this situation could arise if at the time of presenting the presenter
had forgotten his prior notice.
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ment or acceptance and any prior transferor warrants to a person
who in good faith pays or accepts . . . ." [Emphasis added.]
Under the NIL, warranties are regarded as part of negotiation 4
or indorsement,"5 but not as part of a payment or acceptance transaction. The warranties are given only to certain holders,' 6 and to
be such a holder the paper must have been negotiated to the person
claiming status as such as holder.' 7 Section 191 of the NIL defines
a holder as a payee or indorsee in possession, or one in possession
of bearer paper.' Under this definition, an acceptor can not be a
holder. However, a payor bank might be an indorsee if the person
presenting indorsed the paper to the bank's order. Upon payment,
the bank obtains possession of the paper. Thus, the bank would be
an indorsee in possession. Despite this, the NIL provides no warranty because once paid the paper is discharged and no longer
negotiable. Nevertheless, many courts have ignored the technical
requirement and have given the benfit of warranties to drawees
(payor banks 9 ) basing their decisions upon some elusive "implied"
warranties.2 o
Under the Code, courts no longer need to search for implied
non-statutory warranties. Acceptors and payors are specifically included within the Code's warranties. Negotiation, therefore, is not
the basis of warranty protection under the Code.2 '
There is no provision in either the NIL or the Code relating to
the measure of damages for breach of warranty.2 2 Recovery for a
breach of a presentment warranty is predicated upon a covenant
14. NIL § 65.
15.

NIL § 66.

16. Ibid.
17.
18.

NIL § 30.
" 'Holder' means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession

of it, or the bearer thereof." NIL § 191.
19.

(b)

"In this Article unless the context otherwise requires:

'Payor bank' means a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or
accepted . .. ."

UCC §4-10s. See UCC § 3-102(3) which states that the above definition applies to
Article 3.
20. The payor can rely on the indorser's guaranty of prior indorsements and on
the implied warranties of negotiation. Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Cheltenham
Nat'l Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A.2d 768 (1949). An unrestricted indorsement misleads the

drawee into a belief that the paper is what it purports to be. Cairo Banking Co. v.
West, 187 Ga. 666, 2 S.E.2d 91 (1939).
21. UCC § 3-417(1): "Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any
prior transferorwarrants . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
22. Hawkland, Commercial Paper 70-71 (1959).
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independent of the endorsement contract. Damages recoverable
under one obligation may differ from that recoverable under the
other.2 3 A qualified endorsement, e.g., "without recourse," 24 imposes
no contractual liability on the indorser. However, the qualified endorser is still subject to certain warranty obligations. 25 Again, the
warranty undertaking may be to a more limited group that that to
which the endorsement contract is directed. For purposes of nonwarranty contractual liability, "no person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears thereon." 2' 6 But warranties of
presentment are imposed even in the absence of signature. "7
J. Warranty of Good Title
UCC section 3-417 ( 1) (a) provides:
Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior
transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays or accepts
that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title ....
Before analyzing the operation of section 3-417 (1) (a), it seems
necessary to determine what is meant by "good title". The Code

fails to define either "good title" or "title." As a personal property
concept, "good title" means "general and full ownership of the
goods. ' 28 It appears that this is the meaning to be given the term
23. Damages for breach of warranty are limited to actual damages sustained by
the tranferee-damages that the transferee could have recovered from the maker if
the warranty had not been breached. McNaghten Loan Co. v. Sandifer, 137 Kan. 353,
20 P.2d 523 (1933) (Decided under the NIL). Recovery is limited to the value given
by the transferee, plus interest, less payments received on the instrument. First Discount
Corp. v. Sutton, 96 Ohio App. 256, 121 N.E.2d 657 (1954) (decided under the NIL).
24-. UCC§3-414(1):
Unless the endorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words as "without
recourse") every endorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice
of dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at
the time of his endorsement to the holder or to any subsequent endorser who
takes it up, even though the endorser who takes it up was not obligated to do
SO.
The language of this section clearly indicates what is the contract of a qualified
endorser.
25. UCC§3-417(1), (2).
26. UCC §3-401(1). The other contractual warranty is to the effect that the
endorser will pay the instrument upon notice of dishonor. UCC § 3-414.
27. UCC § 3-417(1) refers to "any prior transferor."
28. See Dixon, Special Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A New
Concept In Sales, 4 Natural Resources J. 98 (1964). UCC § 1-103 adopts supplementary
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as used in section 3-417(1) (a). Good title to commercial paper
seems to embrace rightful ownership of the paper against the
world. It should be understood that a person may be the rightful
owner against the whole world and thus have good title, despite
the fact that the drawer's signature has been forged, and despite
the fact that the paper has been materially altered. The property
right exists although the contract rights represented by the paper
may not be as they appear on the face of the paper. Rightful ownership of the paper has no necessary connection to the contract
rights represented thereby. As used in section 3-417(1) (a), the
warranty of good title is probably a warranty that all necessary indorsements30 in the chain of title are valid.
Despite the fact that courts traditionally have separated the
contract rights represented by the paper and the paper itself, it
seems incongruous to speak of a person having good title to forged
paper. In the case of a chattel, it would seem that title could
emanate only from the owner. The drawer of a check would seem
comparable to an owner of a chattel. Title to a check passes under
the Code, however, although the drawer's signature is forged. The
warranty concerning the drawer's signature is set out separately in
the Code, as is the warranty of no material alteration. 3 1
The Code's warranty of title is made by "any person who obtains
payment or acceptance and any prior transferor . . . to any person
who in good faith pays or accepts. .... Thus, this warranty of
title is made by every transferor and presenter regardless of his
status or good faith. And unlike the other two presentment warranties-no knowledge that the drawer's signature is unauthorized,
and against material alteration-the holder in due course who acts
principles of law. Bonds have been held to be personal property, McCulloch v. McCulloch, 337 S.W.2d 870 (Ark. 1960). Within the definition of a larceny statute, checks
are personal property. Abbott v. State, 149 P.2d 514, 78 Oki. Cr. 407 (1944). Bugan,
When Does Title Pass 3 (2d ed. 1951): "Like property, the word 'title' also conveys
many shades of meaning. However, in legal parlance it refers to that which is the
subject of ownership."
29. 2 Williston, Sales § 258 n.1 (Rev. ed. 1948).
30. Bearer paper requires no indorsement to transfer. "If payable to bearer it is
negotiated by delivery." (Emphasis added.) UCC § 3-202(1).
However, the transferee as part of the transfer agreement may require the transferor to indorse the bearer instrument. But such an indorsement is not a necessary

indorsement to a normal transfer of the instrument.
However, "unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value of an instrument not
then payable to bearer gives the transferee the specifically enforceable right to have
the unqualified indorsement of the transferor." (Emphasis added.) UCC § 3-201 (3).
31. UCC § 3-417(1) (b), (c).
32. UCC §3-417(1).

NO TES
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in good faith is in no favored position and must make the same
title warranty as made by every other transferor and presenter.
The shelter provision vests title in the transferee if the transferor
had it, but only to that extent. Thus, application of the shelter
provision cannot result in the transferee taking better title than
that of his transferor. This conclusion is opposed to the possible
result reached under the other two warranties wherein a transferee
may be benefitted by the shelter provision and thus be in a better
position than his tranferor.
B. Warranty of No Knowledge that the Drawer'sSignature is
Unauthorized
Neither the presenting party's knowledge or lack thereof nor his
good or bad faith affects the warranty of good title. It is a warranty
that a certain condition exists. The warranty of section 3-417 (1 ) (b)
concerning the validity of the drawer's signature is less rigid. The
presenting party merely warrants his lack of knowledge of the invalidity of the drawer's or maker's signature. Section 3-417 (1) (b)
provides:
Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior
transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays or accepts
that
he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer
is unauthorized, except that this warranty is not given to a holder
in due course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature,
whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took
the draft after the acceptance without knowledge that the
drawer's signature was unauthorized . .

.

. [Emphasis

added.]

The Code States that a person can know a fact only "when he has
actual knowledge of it.""3 If a fact is non-existant, a person cannot
have "actual knowledge of it." Hence, if the signature is autho33. UCC § 1-201(25):
A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge
of it. 'Discover' or 'learn' or a word or phrase of similar import refers to
knowledge rather than to reason to know.

NATURAL
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rized, there can be no knowledge of an "unauthorized" signing.
Therefore, if the signing is authorized, the presenter's belief to
the contrary, even if he acts in bad faith, is irrelevant.
If the presenter is a holder in due course acting in good faith,
he makes the basic (1) (b) warranty to the paying or accepting
bank but not to the classes of persons designated by clauses (i),
(ii), and (iii).
When is the presenting holder in due course (HDC) "acting in
good faith"? "Good faith" is defined by the Code as "honesty in
fact."'3 4 "Acting in good faith" is not defined as a separate term,
but applying the definition of "good faith" to the word "acting",
the presenting HDC, to avoid making warranties to those listed in
clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) must be "acting honestly in fact" when
presenting the paper. He may have had knowledge or notice of the
defect in the drawer's signature, but if, in fact, he has forgotten it,
he can present in good faith and without knowledge. "Good faith"
is a condition precedent if the HDC is to limit this warranty to
certain classes of people, i.e., a maker, a drawer, and under additional circumstances, an acceptor. This limitation as to whom the
warranty is made is offered also by the warranty of no material
alteration,3 5 if the presenter is acting in good faith. Since both the
warranties of the drawer's signature and the warranty of no material alteration present this same limitation in the case of a presenting HDC acting in good faith, the application of "acting in good
faith" as it affects these two warranties will be analyzed only once.
This analysis is found under the discussion concerning the warranty
of no material alteration. 6
Subsection (1) (b) of 3-417 clearly adopts the doctrine of Price
v. Neal 3 7-a drawee on acceptance or payment of a bill admits the
genuiness of the drawer's signature. This is an admission which the
drawee cannot subsequently deny against a good faith holder for
value. In Price v. Neal, two bills, each bearing a forged signature of
the drawer, were paid by the drawee. The first bill was presented
for payment, the presenter having taken the bill after acceptance.
The second bill was presented for payment without an intervening
acceptance. In both presentments, the drawee and presenter were
acting in good faith. Upon discovery of the forgery, the drawee
34.
35.
36.
37.

UCC § 1-201(19), quoted in note 12 supra.
UCC§3-417(1)(c).
See text at 408-10 infra.
3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
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sought recovery from the presenter. The court found for the presenter, rejecting the claim of mutual mistake offered by the drawee.
The Code adopts the result of Price v. Neal via the use of warranties and the finality of payment section, 3-418. 3s Thus, if the
payor pays to a holder in due course who makes the warranty of
no knowledge that the drawer's signature is unauthorized, and the
warranty is not breached, the payor will not be able to recover the
payment from the presenter if in fact the warranted signature was
authorized. This was the situation posed by the second bill that was
presented in Pricev. Neal. The court's rationale was that the drawee
had the best opportunity to discover the forgery of the drawer's
signature. Today, the need for finality of payment is the widely
accepted reason."9 As in the case of the first bill presented in Price,
if the presenter is an innocent holder in due course who takes after
acceptance, recovery for an unauthorized drawer's signature is
denied to the payor. The basis for such a conclusion is the presenter's reliance on the acceptance.40 But while the drawee has the
burden of recognizing the signatures of his drawers, he is not responsible for ascertaining the validity of the indorsements. Thus,
the good title warranty is breached if in fact good title is not presented. But lack of knowledge, not the fact of forgery, controls
the warranty of the validity of the drawer's signature. The distinction is justified. The "drawee is in a position to verify the drawer's
signature by comparison with one in his hand, but has ordinarily no
opportunity to verify an indorsement."'" At least one court has
held that in the case of a double forgery (where both the drawer's
signature and payee's indorsement are forged) the instrument will
be considered essentially as bearing only a forged drawer's signature.42
Price v. Neal concerned not only an innocent presenter, but an
innocent payor. The Code maintains the rule that the warranties of
presentment are given only "to a person who in good faith pays
43
or accepts."

38. See UCC § 3-418, Comments 1 and 2.
39. UCC § 3-418, Comment 1: "It is highly desirable to end the transaction on an
instrument when it is paid .... .
40. UCC § 3-417, Comment 4.
41. UCC § 3-417, Comment 3.
42. Trust Co. of America v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 127 App. Div. 515, 112 N.Y.S.
84 (1908). In this case the payee was never intended to receive the instrument or its
proceeds. In effect then, the instrument became bearer paper. Recovery by the payor,
if at all, would be predicated on a breach of warranty of the drawer's signature.
43. UCC §3-417(1).
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C. Warranty of No Material 4teration
The third and last presentment warranty is that the instrument
has not been materially altered. Section 3-417 (1) (c) provides:
Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior
transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays or accepts

that
the instrument has not been materially altered, except that this
warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting in good faith

(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is
also the drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration
made prior to the acceptance if the holder in due course
took the draft after the acceptance, even though the acceptance provided "payable as originally drawn" or equivalent terms; or

(iv) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration
made after the acceptance. [Emphasis added.]

Some resemblance to the two prior warranties is immediately
noted. Like the warranty of good title, the warranty of no material
alteration is stated as an objective fact-the presenter's knowledge
being irrelevant. And like the warranty of no knowledge that the
drawer's signature is unauthorized, a holder in due course acting
in good faith warrants only to a smaller class of people-thus, often
being relieved of liability.
An "alteration" must be distinguished from a "forgery." A
forged indorsement involves the warranty of title.4 4 A material
alteration is an alteration which changes the contract of any party
to the instrument in any respect, 4 such as a change in the date payable. 6 It includes the completing of an incomplete instrument other
than as authorized by the maker. 7 If an alteration is made by the
44. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.

45. UCC§3-407(1):
Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the contract of
any party thereto in any respect, including any such change in
(a) the number or relations of the parties; or
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized; or
(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of it.
46. See UCC § 3-407, Comment 1.
47. UCC§3-407(1)(b).
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holder, which is both material and fradulent, a party whose contract is thereby changed is discharged on the instrument except as
against a holder in due course.4 With any other alteration, the
instrument may be enforced in accordance with its original tenor.4 9
Since in order to discharge parties, a holder must materially alter
the instrument, any alteration by a non-holder, e.g., spoliation, or a
non-fradulent alteration by a holder, will not affect the rights of a
later holder.5 0
Similar to the warranty of the maker's or drawer's signature,
the warranty of no material alterations is not made to a maker, a
drawer, or an acceptor (under certain conditions) if the persenter
is a holder in due course acting in good faith. The drafters of the
Code thought that the maker or drawer should be able to recognize
the instrument as having been altered,"' since such maker or drawer
himself drew the instrument. Thus, if a maker accepts or pays an
altered instrument to a holder in due course acting in good faith,
such action is final. However, if the presenter is not a holder in due
course acting in good faith and the instrument has been materially
altered, payment or acceptance is not final. The acceptor or payor
then may recover from the presenter as he could both at common
law 2 and under the NIL."
In addition, the HDC acting in good faith does not make this
warranty to the acceptor if the alteration is prior to acceptance and
the presenter took thereafter. Again, as under the warranty of no
knowledge that the drawer's or maker's signature is unauthorized,
reliance on the prior acts of the acceptor is the basis for protecting
the good faith HDC. The Code changes the positions of both the
common law and the NIL and adopts the NIL minority position
that "according to tenor of acceptance" of NIL section 62 means
at the time of acceptance, i.e., "the drawee's signed engagement to
honor the draft as presented." ' 4 Clause (iii) of section 3-417 (1) (c)
48. UCC §3-407(2) (a).
49. UCC § 3-407(2) (b).

50. See UCC § 3-407, Comment 3a.
51. See UCC § 3-417, Comment 5.
52. Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.) 604 (1873) ; Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 N.Y. 230 (1850).
In both cases, all parties were acting in good faith. And in both cases recovery
by the drawee was based on the pre-Code doctrine of mutual mistake.
53. Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260
(1919). NIL warranties were not made to payors. The payor recovered under the
doctrine of mutual mistake.
54.

UCC§3-410(1).
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additionally negates any attempt by an acceptor or payor to by-pass
the warranty, i.e., the warranty is not given "even though the acceptance provided 'payable as originally drawn' or equivalent
terms. . .."55
The last clause in this last presentment warranty (section
3-417(1) (c) (iv)) states that a warranty of no material alteration is not given by a HDC acting in good faith "to the acceptor
of a draft with respect to an alteration made after the acceptance."
This exception was not in the 1952 Official Text but has been included in the 1958 and 1962 versions. Prior to the inclusion
of this exception, the HDC acting in good faith was not exempted
from the warranty of no material alteration made after acceptance.
The basis for protecting the good faith HDC is analogous to that
for protecting him against the claim of a maker who has paid or
accepted. The acceptor has records of acceptance which can be used
to verify the presented instrument as to its contents when accepted.
He should know what he accepted. If, nevertheless, the acceptor
pays, such payment is final.
III

MYTH OF THE SHELTER PROVISION

Three hypothetical problems are set out below. Each demonstrates the operation of a single warranty. In each hypothetical, the
other two warranties not discussed are assumed to have not been
breached.
1. Warranty of good title. Since the warranty of good title is
good title in fact, neither good faith nor a lack of it on the part of
the presenter is relevant to a breach. If the warranty is breached,
recovery may be had by the payor. The shelter provision has no
effect.
2. Warranty of no knowledge that the drawer's signature is
unauthorized. A, an HDC, transfers the instrument to B after its
maturity. Under the shelter provision (section 3-201 (1)), B acquires all of A's rights as an HDC. But if A did not know that the
drawer's signature was forged and B did, B's guilty knowledge will
cause him to breach the warranty. Had J presented, payment to
him would have been final. Thus, the shelter provision can help B
55. UCC § 3-417(1) (c)(iii).
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as regards this warranty only if, in his own right, he lacks knowledge
of the forgery. The reverse would be true if A learned of the unauthorized drawer's signature before he transferred to B, and B
took after maturity but without knowledge of the invalidity of the
signature. Here B could retain what was paid to him despite A's
guilty knowledge. "6 The shelter provision affords no protection for
B when he has guilty knowledge. It protects him from being burdened with A's guilty knowledge, however, in that such knowledge
is not attributed to him through the shelter provision.
3. Warranty of no material alteration. C, an HDC, transfers
an instrument to D after maturity. Under the shelter provision, D
acquires all of C's rights as an HDC. Assuming that the instrument
was materially altered, but that an HDC could enforce it according
to its original tenor, then, under the shelter provision, D can enforce the instrument according to its original tenor.
The warranty of no material alteration is breached by D when
he presents the instrument. Thus, if a drawee of a check pays D
the altered amount of the check, D, having presented an altered
instrument, will be required to disgorge all he received over and
above the amount for which the original check was drawn. He will
have to do this whether he acted in good or bad faith.
But, if D took a note and presented it to the maker for payment,
and was paid, D's good faith apparently would be determinative
of whether he could be forced to disgorge. A holder in due course
acting in good faith makes no warranty concerning alteration, to
the maker, the drawer, and, under additional circumstances, to the
acceptor. 57 If C, who is D's HDC transferor, had neither knowledge
nor suspicion of the alteration at the time he transferred to D, but
D had such knowledge or suspicion, D could not rely on C's good
faith. He would breach the warranty to the maker and could be
forced to disgorge everything over the amount for which the instrument was originally drawn. If C had the guilty knowledge or
suspicion, but D did not, D could rely on his own good faith and
retain whatever the maker paid him. Here again the shelter provision affords no protection to D, the person taking under it,
against the burdens of his own bad faith. Again, C's bad faith is
not transferred to the party taking under the shelter provision.
56. However, since the presentment warranties are also imposed upon "any prior
transferor," (section 3-417(1)), A would be liable for the breach of warranty.
57. UCC § 3-417(1) (c) (iii).
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CONCLUSION

The scope of the warranty of no knowledge that the drawer's or
maker's signature is unauthorized and of the warranty of no material alteration is affected by the presenter's status as an HDC acting in good faith. As discussed earlier,5" good faith is non-transferable. Thus, while all of the "rights" of an HDC can be transferred under the shelter provision (section 3-201 (1) ), his "right"
to be relieved of warranty liability under section 3-417 (1) is not
transferred. Where an HDC acting in good faith (in warranty
terms) transfers to one who has guilty knowledge, the transferee,
while having all of the rights of the HDC, warrants to a wider
group of people than would his transferor; he warrants to makers,
drawers, and acceptors. The shelter provision cannot provide the
good faith necessary to protect him. To this extent, at least, its
protection is a myth.
WILLIAM F. TULLt

58. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
t Member, Board of Editors, 1963-64.

